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The performance of eyewitnesses under conditions of heightened stress is of par-
ticular forensic interest. When witnessing a crime of violence, the response of the 
eyewitness is almost always one of generating a stress response to the stressor im-
posed by the crime. The stress response is actually the defensive response set stud-
ied in some detail by psychophysiologists (e.g., Klorman, Weissberg, & Wiesen-
feld, 1977). This defensive reaction is the physiological response (acceleration in 
heart rate, increased blood pressure and muscle tone) that results when the activa-
tion mode of attention control is dominant (Tucker & Williamson, 1984). The acti-
vation mode is one of two neural control systems for regulating response to envi-
ronmental demands. It is characterized by a tonic readiness for action, a bias against 
stimu lus change, and processing under tight attention controls. Tasks eliciting ac-
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tivation mode dominance include any task serving to increase cognitive anxiety 
(worry) and/or somatic anxiety (conscious perception of physiological activation), 
including vigilance, escape, avoidance, or “pressure” tasks (Deffenbacher, 1994).
When assessing any effect of a condition of heightened stress, one must of 
course compare it with a condition demonstrably lower in stress or even one free of 
stress, the latter condition being one wherein the arousal mode of attention control 
is dominant (Tucker & Williamson, 1984). Here the physiological response is that of 
the orienting response (Lacey & Lacey, 1974), a deceleration of heart rate, lowered 
blood pressure and muscle tone, and an increase in skin conductance with differ-
ent temporal characteristics than is the case when the activation mode is dominant. 
The arousal mode of neural control functions to support alert wakeful ness and re-
sponsiveness to environmental change and novel stimulation. Attention is allocated 
to the most informative aspect of the stimulus array, rather than being restricted to a 
specifi c semantic or motivational content, as is typical when the acti vation mode of 
attention control is dominant. Tasks involving simple perceptual in take have been 
shown to elicit the arousal mode of attention control (Deffenbacher, 1994). Presum-
ably nonthreatening eyewitness events would elicit the arousal mode. 
It is clearly important to know just how heightened stress impacts the fi delity of 
an eyewitness’s memory. Since the renaissance of research on eyewitness testi mony 
began in the early 1970s, a scientifi c literature has accumulated concerning the effects 
of heightened stress on the fi delity of eyewitness memory. Nevertheless, 30 years of 
data have not as yet yielded a clear picture of whether heightened stress has a posi-
tive, negative, or null effect on eyewitness memory. The principal goal of the present 
review is to ascertain which of these three possible relations actually obtains. 
The fi rst systematic review of the literature relating the effects of heightened 
stress to eyewitness memory was conducted by Deffenbacher (1983). Typical for 
the time, Deffenbacher made the assumption that all stressors act to increase gen-
eral arousal, whether they be high intensity white noise, electric shock, ego-involv-
ing in structions, seriousness of a viewed crime, or violence level of a viewed crime. 
The generally accepted theoretical explanation of the stress-performance relation-
ship was that variations in stressor intensity affected performance level according to 
an inverted-U function, the function described by the Yerkes–Dodson law (1908). 
For tasks of at least moderate complexity, and eyewitness identifi cation tasks would 
ap pear to qualify, the Yerkes–Dodson law states that performance improves with in-
creases in arousal up to some optimal point and then declines with further increas-
es. In his review of 21 relevant published and unpublished studies, Deffenbacher 
noted that 10 had produced results which suggested that higher arousal levels in-
creased eyewitness accuracy or at least did not decrease it. The remaining 11 stud-
ies pro duced results showing lowered memory accuracy with increases in arousal. 
Deffen bacher argued that the studies showing facilitation of memory by arousal in-
creases were likely dealing with arousal increases within the range encompassed by 
the as cending portion of the inverted-U curve; studies showing memory debilitation 
with arousal increases were likely operating in the range encompassed by the de-
scending portion of the Yerkes–Dodson curve. 
EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ON EYEWITNESS MEMORY
A decade later, Christianson (1992) again reviewed the now burgeoning lit erature 
relating what he referred to as emotional stress and eyewitness memory. He came to 
rather different conclusions than did Deffenbacher (1983). First, he ar gued that there 
was not much evidence to support the notion that emotional stress debilitates eyewitness 
memory. Second, he proposed that the Yerkes–Dodson law is not an appropriate de-
scription of the relation of emotional stress to the fi delity of eyewitness memory. Third, 
he concluded that in general memory for negative emotional events is better than that 
for neutral events, at least for central details; typically, however, memory for noncen-
tral details is worse for negative emotional events than for neutral ones. He suggested 
that the better memory for central de tails was due to negative emotional events causing 
greater focusing of attention and increased elaboration of the details within that focus. 
Thus far we have established that the studies assessing the effect on memory 
of what has been variously referred to as heightened stress, anxiety, arousal, or neg-
ative emotionality have yielded all possible effects on memory performance, pos-
itive, negative, and null. The two reviewers of this literature (Christianson, 1992; 
Deffenbacher, 1983) arrived at different empirical generalizations that would char-
acterize its body of fi ndings, though admittedly, these two snapshots of the litera-
ture occurred a decade apart and included a different mix of research methodolo-
gies. Is there a way of resolving this apparent muddle? 
We propose that a theoretical alternative to the Yerkes–Dodson law can assist in 
clearing up at least some of the muddle. In a more recent review, Deffenbacher (1994) 
revisited the concept of an unidimensional continuum of arousal and con cluded that 
it could no longer be sustained. He likewise concluded that the Yerkes–Dodson law 
was no longer a useful explanatory construct. Deffenbacher then presented an integra-
tive theoretical alternative to unidimensional arousal theory, a synthesis of Tucker and 
Williamson’s (1984) asymmetric neural control systems model and Fazey and Hardy’s 
(1988) catastrophe model of anxiety and per formance, a model that has made some 
very specifi c predictions that have been empirically confi rmed (e.g., Hardy & Parfi tt, 
1991). The latter model is a three-dimensional model including two predictor variables, 
cognitive anxiety (worry) and physiological activation, the conscious perception of 
which has been labeled somatic anxiety; the dependent variable is performance. Fazey 
and Hardy (1988) had con cluded from their review of the anxiety-performance litera-
ture that any satisfactory model had to be at least three-dimensional. Fazey and Hardy 
also noted that their model accounted for four different relationships between anxiety 
and performance found in their literature review. As Deffenbacher (1994) has point-
ed out, the most interesting prediction from their model is the prediction that at rela-
tively high levels of cognitive anxiety, continuous gradual increases in somatic anxiety 
(physiological activation) will at fi rst result in continuous, gradual increases in perfor-
mance, fol lowed at some point by a catastrophic, discontinuous drop in performance. 
Thus acting in concert, cognitive anxiety and physiological activation produce nonlin-
ear effects on performance. As Deffenbacher (1994) has also noted, a close examina-
tion of the data of at least two studies of eyewitness memory (Bothwell, Brigham, & 
Pigott, 1987; Peters, 1988) confi rms the prediction of a catastrophic drop in memory 
performance at high levels of cognitive anxiety and physiological activation. 
690 DEFFENBACHER ET AL. IN LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 28 (2004)
Thus by Deffenbacher’s (1994) integrative theoretical formulation, if a task elicits 
the arousal mode of attention control, then memory will be enhanced for the most infor-
mative aspects of the stimulus display, those aspects on which the ori enting response is 
focused. If, on the other hand, a task elicits the activation mode of attention control, then 
memory will either be modestly enhanced or drastically reduced, depending on the rela-
tive amounts of cognitive anxiety and physiological activation present. 
We are now in a position to begin clearing up the aforementioned muddle of 
fi ndings. Since 1984, a substantial number of studies have been published show-
ing that increases in what was referred to as negative emotionality not only did 
not ad versely impact memory for central details of a scenario but actually im-
proved mem ory relative to that for central details of a scenario signifi cantly low-
er in negative emotionality. The only adverse impact on memory by increased 
negative emotion ality was on the less important peripheral details. These stud-
ies were a major focus of Christianson’s (1992) review and certainly make quite 
understandable his claim that there was not much evidence to support the notion 
that emotional stress debil itates eyewitness memory. 
We believe that these studies (e.g., Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Chris-
tianson, 1984; Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman, & Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 
1990; Libkuman, Nichols-Whitehead, Griffi th, & Thomas, 1999, Safer, Christian-
son, Autry, & Osterlund, 1998) were generating facilitation of eyewit ness memory 
for central details, because their principal experimental manipulations likely gener-
ated an orienting response (arousal mode of attention control) to stim ulating condi-
tions, rather than the defensive response (activation mode of atten tion control) typ-
ically produced by a successful manipulation of stress or anxiety (Deffenbacher, 
1994, 1999). The implicit assumption by these investigators appears to have been 
that higher ratings of negative emotionality for experimental condi tion stimulus 
materials (e.g., a modestly gruesome accident or surgery scene) as compared to rat-
ings of control condition stimuli signifi ed a successful manipulation of an emotion-
al state that was akin to stress or anxiety. Another implicit assump tion was that by 
increasing physical exertion not directly relevant to the viewed scenario (e.g., rid-
ing an exercise bicycle), a successful manipulation of a physio logical state akin to 
that comprising a defensive response had been attained. As Deffenbacher (1994, 
1999) has argued, however, the key experimental manipulation in these studies al-
most certainly elicited orienting responses, rather than defensive responses. 
For one thing, these studies were carried out in laboratory settings where both 
cognitive anxiety and physiological activation should have been relatively low. 
Base line heart rates in these studies averaged 68–82 beats per min (b.p.m.), with-
in the normal range of resting heart rates for young adults. Second, the tasks pre-
sented were those of simple perceptual intake or perceptual intake plus instruc-
tions empha sizing the need to attend closely to the central and peripheral details 
of an external event. The negative emotional content of events depicted on key 
slides was neither a threat to the bodily integrity nor to the self-esteem of the ob-
server. The content was gruesome enough, however, to have elicited an orienting 
response (Hare, 1972; Hare, Wood, Britain, & Frazelle, 1971; Hare, Wood, Brit-
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ain, & Shadman, 1970; Klorman et al., 1977). For example, Hare et al. (1970, 
1971) showed that there was not only not a defensive response but in actuality a 
stronger orienting response to unretouched, color slides of homicide victims than 
to slides of everyday objects. Hare et al. (1970, 1971) showed heart rate deceler-
ation of 3–5 b.p.m., an important index of an orienting response, as did several 
of the aforementioned investigators of increases in negative emotionality. Chris-
tianson (1984) also noted an increase in skin conductance to stimuli of greater 
negative emotionality, another index of an orienting response to a stimulus dis-
play. Interestingly, Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, and Hamm (1993) found that inter-
est ratings and duration of time an observer chooses to view a visual display both 
load on the same factor as does the magni tude of the skin conductance response. 
A straightforward prediction would be that if a task elicits an orienting re sponse, 
then memory will be enhanced for the most interesting and informative aspects of the 
stimulus display, those aspects enjoying the beam of attention pro vided by the orient-
ing response. Indeed, such memory enhancement was observed in many of the stud-
ies involving a manipulation of negative emotionality. Thus, Christianson (1992) was 
correct that the better memory for central details in these studies was due to a greater 
focusing of attention on them. However, the relevant mechanism was a qualitatively 
different one than the one he supposed, the orient ing response of the arousal mode of 
attention regulation, rather than the defensive response characteristic of the activation 
mode of attention regulation. Hence the results of these studies are not relevant to as-
sessing the effect of heightened stress on the fi delity of eyewitness memory. 
Thus, we are limiting our focus to studies whose experimental manipulations 
were actually productive of a difference in stress response level. Now given that 
neither the seminal Shapiro and Penrod (1986) meta-analysis of the eyewitness lit-
erature nor any subsequent one has addressed the effect of heightened stress on eye-
witness memory, it would be desirable to have a fi rm estimate of effect size and di-
rection, both in regard to accuracy of face identifi cation and recall of details. As 
mentioned earlier, this is the primary goal of the present review. Other goals include 
identifying variables that might moderate any consistent effect of stress on the fi -
delity of memory, identifying any methodological or theoretical shortcomings in 
the body of relevant literature, and to consider possible directions for future theoret-
ical development and research. 
METHOD 
Sample 
Inasmuch as the present review was part of a comprehensive meta-analysis 
project, a thorough search of social science citation retrieval systems was con-
ducted. These systems included PsycINfO, Educational Resources Information 
Center (ERIC), Sociological Abstracts, Dissertation Abstracts International, Dis-
sertations on-line ( http://www.contentville.com/content/dissertations.asp ), Med-
line, and Social Scisearch (the Social Science Citation Index). These computer 
database searches were supplemented with more traditional search methods, in-
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cluding use of bibliographic citations in published research and in social science 
convention pro ceedings and contacting leading researchers, in order to identify 
the most recent published research. 
No unpublished studies were included, because the legal standards for prof-
fered scientifi c testimony established by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) have strengthened the preference by the legal 
system for meta-analytic conclusions based on a body of well conceived, well exe-
cuted, and easily retrievable studies. In order to be included, a published study must 
have met three criteria: (a) a statistical test of the effect of heightened stress or anx-
iety on one or more measures of eyewitness memory accuracy must have been pro-
vided; (b) either stress/anxiety must have been manipulated directly or have been 
included as a quasi-experimental independent variable; and (c) manipulation checks 
must have been provided showing that putative manipulations of stress/anxiety or 
perceived level of violence had been successful. 
There were in addition three specifi c exclusion criteria for studies wherein the 
claim was made that the relation between stress and eyewitness memory had been 
successfully tested. First, ratings of witness stress or anxiety, whether self-ratings or 
by others, had to be concurrent, as soon after encoding of the target person(s) as pos-
sible, not retrospective. Some studies of children’s memory for medical proce dures 
have involved retrospective ratings that were delayed by periods of a week up to as 
much as a year or more (e.g., Peterson & Bell, 1996; Quas et al., 1999). Second, mea-
sures of memory had to be from an initial assessment, a measure of memory unsul-
lied by previous attempts at identifi cation or recall. Again, some studies of children’s 
memory for medical procedures have focused on long-term recall after two or more 
previous assessments of recall accuracy (e.g., Burgwyn-Bailes, Baker-Ward, Gordon, 
& Ornstein, 2001; Peterson & Whalen, 2001). Third, measures of recall accuracy that 
were included were only of straightforward efforts at either free recall or interrogative 
recall (cued recall). Measures of recall accuracy after attempts at misleading poste-
vent suggestion were not included (e.g., Bruck, Ceci, Francoeur, & Barr, 1995). 
There were two fi nal study samples. The fi rst sample included 16 published 
papers, providing a total of 27 independent estimates of effect size for height-
ened stress on accuracy of face identifi cation. This sample included work pub-
lished be tween 1974 and 1997, with a total of 1727 participants involved in rel-
evant tests of the stress/anxiety effect. Sample sizes across the 27 tests of the 
effect ranged from 18 to 165 (M = 64.0). 
In order to conduct a companion meta-analysis of the effects of heightened 
stress on accuracy of eyewitness recall (of perpetrator characteristics, crime scene 
details, and actions of central characters), another sample of 18 published pa pers 
meeting the aforementioned criteria for inclusion was collected. Ten of these pub-
lished papers were also included in the prior sample, studies which had in cluded 
measures both of face identifi cation accuracy and accuracy of recall. This latter 
sample provided 36 independent estimates of effect size and yielded a to tal of 1946 
participants in the various tests of the effect of stress/anxiety on accu racy of eyewit-
ness recall. Across the 36 tests, sample sizes varied from 18 to 249 (M = 54.1). 
EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ON EYEWITNESS MEMORY
Study Characteristics 
The previously mentioned comprehensive meta-analysis is intended to update 
and to extend the one conducted by Shapiro and Penrod (1986). The current com-
prehensive meta-analysis, from which the current study springs, ultimately has en-
compassed coding of approximately 450 existing studies of face recognition from 
both the eyewitness and laboratory face recognition memory traditions. Several 
dozen independent variables were coded for each of these studies. These variables 
included stable (e.g., sex and race) and malleable (e.g., disguise) characteristics of 
both participants and targets, situational (e.g., exposure duration), and procedur-
al (e.g., lineup presentation) factors. Variables worthy of specifi c mention for their 
usefulness in the present review included type of study (eyewitness identifi cation 
study or laboratory face recognition study), whether or not the study employed a 
staged crime, whether the lineup included the target-present (TP) or target-absent 
(TA), number of participants, age of participants, and most important, whether anx-
iety, stress, or violence level was manipulated.5 Dependent variables recorded were 
proportion correct, hit and false alarm rates, if provided, for TP lineups, correct re-
jection and false alarm rates, when provided, for TA lineups, and the signal detec-
tion measures, d-prime and beta. 
Statistics 
In order to test the statistical reliability of an estimate of the typical effect size 
found in any particular meta-analysis, we have adopted the Stouffer method (Rosen-
thal, 1995). Here a meta-analytic Z(Zma) was calculated by combining Z-scores as-
sociated with individual tests of the hypothesis that heightened stress neg atively im-
pacts eyewitness memory. The resulting algebraic sum, when divided by √k, where 
k is the number of independent estimates of the effect size, yields the meta-analyt-
ic Z. The probability associated with the meta-analytic Z is the overall probabili-
ty of a Type I error associated with the observed pattern of re sults. Inasmuch as Zma 
provides an unweighted estimate of the overall probabil ity level, a meta-analytic 
Z(Zmn) was also calculated which weighted individual Z-scores by sample size of 
the study; this allows estimation of population param eters with greater emphasis on 
larger samples and their more reliable parameter estimates. 
It should be noted that whenever recovery of sample sizes and proportion of 
correct identifi cations per condition permitted, the Z-score entered into the meta-
analysis was one calculated for the difference between proportions. When an exact 
Z-score could not be calculated for a given effect size estimate, a Z-score associated 
with the p value for the estimate was entered, 1.65 for p = .05, for instance. When 
a test of the hypothesis was reported as not signifi cant, but no statistics were cited, 
the conservative procedure of entering Z = .00 was followed (Rosenthal, 1995). 
5 To assess the reliability of coding study independent variables, two raters generated separate codings for 
each of 80 variables across a randomly selected 50% of the studies included in the present meta-analysis. Rate of 
agreement across all variables and 14 studies averaged 93%. 
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All studywise differences between proportions for high and low stress con-
ditions were converted to the effect size h, inasmuch as h is the coeffi cient recom-
mended by Cohen (1988) when testing for differences between proportions. Hence, 
mean effect size for any set of studies and its associated 95% confi dence interval is 
expressed in terms of h. 
Finally, given that we have included only published studies in the present meta-
 analysis, it is quite clear that our sample of studies is not a random sample of all 
stud ies that may actually have been conducted. As Rosenthal (1995) has pointed 
out, it is rather likely that published studies have reported lower probabilities of a 
Type I er ror than have those studies “squirreled away in fi le drawers.” The concern 
in regards to this “fi le drawer problem” is that a suffi cient number of such studies 
averaging null results could threaten a meta-analytic conclusion. We have therefore 
employed Rosenthal’s (1995) suggested procedure for calculating a fail-safe N(Nfs) 
in order to determine the number of unknown or not retrieved studies averaging 
null results required to increase the probability of a Type I error to the just signifi -
cant level of p = .05. Actually, inasmuch as this number is typically a whole num-
ber plus a frac tional number of studies, we have adopted the rule of rounding to the 
next higher number. Thus, most values of the fail-safe N that we report in connec-
tion with a meta-analytic Z, represent the number of additional null results studies 
required to increase our probability of a Type I error to a value slightly greater than 
.05. Clearly, the fail-safe N represents a “tolerance for future null results” (Rosen-
thal, 1995). We would propose that at an absolute minimum the fail-safe N must be 
at least as large as the number of independent estimates of effect size that went into 
calculating the meta-analytic Z. 
RESULTS 
Meta-Analysis 1: Identifi cation Accuracy 
All Tests 
We fi rst sought to determine the overall status of the hypothesis that height ened 
stress debilitates eyewitness memory for faces. For this analysis proportion correct for 
the low stress condition was subtracted from that of the high stress con dition. This has 
the virtue of producing a positive meta-analytic Z should high stress facilitate eyewit-
ness memory and a negative value should high stress debilitate eye witness memory. In 
this instance, overall proportion of correct identifi cations for the high stress condition 
was .42; for the low stress condition, it was .54. Mean effect size, h, for this analy-
sis was −.31 (95% CI: −.04 to −.58); median effect size was −.27. The meta-analytic Z 
(Zma)was −6.44, p < .0001, Nfs = 390. Weighting each of the 27 independent tests of the 
hypothesis by sample size yielded Zmn = −6.03, p < .0001, Nfs = 336 studies. These anal-
yses provide clear support for the hypothesis that heightened stress has a negative im-
pact on eyewitness identifi cation accuracy. In subsequent analyses, we tested for mod-
erator variables which might account for the considerable variability in effect sizes of 
individual tests of the hypothesis (effect size range: −3.02 to +.52; s = .68; see Table 1). 
Table 2 contains a summary of all effect sizes associated with Meta-Analyses 1 and 2. 
EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ON EYEWITNESS MEMORY
Lineup Type 
Because of a comment by Peters (1988) that he had not found the same sta-
tistically reliable difference between high and low stress conditions for TA lineups 
that he had found for TP lineups and because of the forensic implications of TA and 
TP lineups, we decided to code both conditions as independent estimates of the ef-
fect of heightened stress on eyewitness identifi cation for all those studies manipu-
lating lineup type as a between subjects variable (see Table 1). Lineup type clearly 
emerged as the most powerful moderator of the impact of stress on face identifi ca-
tion accuracy (hits and correct rejections). TP lineups (N = 15) generated a mean ef-
fect size h = −.52, 95% CI: −.08 to −.96. Here Zma = −7.08, p < .0001, and Nfs = 
264. On the other hand, TA lineups (N = 5) generated a negligible mean effect size, 
h = +.01 (95% CI: −.39 to +.41). In this case, Zma = −.56, which was clearly not sta-
tistically reliable. Yet another way to examine the different impact of heightened 
stress on face identifi cation accuracy as a function of lineup type is to note that 
mean proportions correct for TP lineups under high and low stress conditions were 
.39 and .59, respectively. Corresponding mean proportions correct for TA lineups 
were .34 and .34. Thus, the overall negative impact of heightened stress on accu-
racy of face identifi cation was due entirely to a substantial effect on hit rate for TP 
lineups. The correct rejection rate for TA lineups was unaffected by stress level. 
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Lineup type moderated the effects of heightened stress on the rate at which 
faces were falsely identifi ed, as well. In this instance, mean false alarm rates for 
TP lineups under high and low stress conditions were .34 and .19, respectively. 
Comparable false alarm rates for TA lineups were .66 and .65. Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that TP lineups (N = 7) generated a mean effect size h = +.37, 95% 
CI: +.05 to +.69. Though Zma = +3.36, p = .0004, the fail-safe N was only 23 ad-
ditional null-results studies. In parallel with the results for pro portion correct, the 
false alarm rates for TA lineups (N = 5) were not differ entially affected by stress 
levels, with the result that mean effect size was negligible, h = .00 (95% CI: −.43 
to +.43). The meta-analytic Zma was +.56, cer tainly not signifi cant. Clearly, the 
overall tendency of heightened stress to increase false alarm rates in a face iden-
tifi cation task, h = +.22 (95% CI: −.02 to +.46), Zma = +2.92, p = .0018, Nfs = 26, 
was due entirely to a substantial effect for TP lineups. 
Research Paradigm 
A somewhat smaller, though still sizeable moderator effect was found for the 
variable of research paradigm, whether the study was conducted as a standard face 
recognition task in the tradition of cognitive psychology or whether it was con-
ducted in the context of the eyewitness identifi cation paradigm. The face recogni-
tion task exposes observers to a relatively large number of target faces (at least 24 
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in studies included in the present meta-analysis). A recognition memory test fol-
lowing exposure to the target faces usually includes twice as many faces, the tar-
gets plus an equal number of unfamiliar distracter faces. Observers are exposed to 
the test faces one at a time and are instructed to respond “yes” or “no” as to wheth-
er a given face had been exposed previously. Studies conducted in the eyewitness 
identifi ca tion paradigm usually expose witnesses to just one or two target faces, 
the perpetra tor(s), and memory for each target’s face is tested either by embed-
ding his/her face in a 5–9-person simultaneously or serially presented live lineup 
or photo spread (TP lineup) or else by substituting someone else who is a match to 
the perpetrator’s de scription (TA lineup). Witnesses are asked to identify the per-
petrator or to indicate that he/she is not in the lineup. 
For the face recognition studies included in our sample (N = 5) the mean pro-
portion correct under high stress conditions was .56 and was .58 under low stress 
conditions. Not surprisingly, the mean effect size in this instance was only −.10 
(95% CI: −.45 to +.25). Even though the meta-analytic Z was signifi cant Zma = 
−2.46, p = .0069, the fail-safe N was only seven additional null results studies. 
Mean proportions correct were .39 and .53 under high and low stress condi-
tions, respectively, for witnesses in the 22 studies executed in the more ecologi-
cally valid eyewitness identifi cation tradition. This difference resulted in a mean 
effect size h = −.36, 95% CI: −.04 to −.68. The debilitating effect of heightened 
stress on eyewitness memory for studies conducted in the eyewitness identifi cation 
paradigm was a statistically reliable one, Zma = −6.00, p < .0001, a conclusion not 
likely to be overturned by unknown null results studies, Nfs = 269. Clearly, height-
ened stress is much more likely to have a debilitating effect on memory for the hu-
man face when encoding and memory testing occur under the requirements of the 
eyewitness iden tifi cation paradigm than when encoding and testing occur under 
conditions of the face recognition memory paradigm. 
Presence/Absence of a Staged Crime 
Within the 22 eyewitness identifi cation studies, six manipulated stress in the 
context of a staged crime, and 16 manipulated stress by some other means, threat 
of an injection, for instance. Mean proportions correct under high and low stress 
conditions were .33 and .50, respectively, for the staged-crime studies. For the stud-
ies manipulating stress by other means, the comparable means were .56 and .69. 
Even though the adverse effect of heightened stress on eyewitness memory was 
sta tistically reliable for both sets of studies, Zma = −3.82, p < .0001, Nfs = 27 for 
the staged-crime studies and Zma = −4.68, p < .0001, Nfs = 113 for the other stud-
ies, there was a pronounced difference in mean effect sizes generated. Mean effect 
sizes were h = −.58, 95% CI: −1.88 to +.72, for the staged crime studies and for 
the studies manipulating stress by other means, a smaller h = −.28, 95% CI: −.02 
to −.54. One study (Buckhout, Alper, Chern, Silverberg, & Slomovits, 1974) was 
re sponsible for most of this difference in effect sizes, however. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that the study of Buckhout et al. (1974) was a rather realistic, live 
staged crime, rather than a fi lmed one. 
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Age 
Given that 15 of our independent estimates of the effect size of heightened stress 
on face identifi cation were produced by adult witnesses/observers and that 12 were 
produced by children (ages ranged from 3 to 10 years), we decided to test age as a 
moderator of effect size. It was also of interest to assess age as a possible moderator, 
given the concern about competency of child witnesses (e.g., Goodman, Hirschman, 
Hepps, & Rudy, 1991). At least for face identifi cation ac curacy, witness age appears 
to have contributed little to the variability in ef fect size. Mean proportions correct for 
children under high and low stress con ditions were .42 and .55, respectively, while 
for adults the proportions were .42 and .54. These differences generated average ef-
fect sizes that were comparable, h = −.27, 95% CI: −.57 to +.03, for the children and 
h = −.34, 95% CI: −.80 to +.12, for the adults. The debilitating effects of heightened 
stress on iden tifi cation accuracy were statistically reliable in both instances. For the 
children, Zma = −3.43, p < .0003, Nfs = 41; for the adults, Zma = −5.61, p < .0001, Nfs = 
159 studies. 
Meta-Analysis 2: Accuracy of Eyewitness Recall 
All Tests 
We should fi rst note that it was not possible to calculate the effect size h 
across all 36 tests of the hypothesis that heightened stress debilitates eyewit-
ness recall. In only fi ve of these instances did investigators report proportion 
of details correctly recalled as a function of stress level; for these fi ve studies h 
= −.25, corresponding to an average proportion correctly recalled of .52 in the 
high stress condition and .64 in the low stress condition. Consequently, d was 
adopted as a substitute measure of effect size. Again, Table 2 summarizes all ef-
fect sizes reported for Meta-Analysis 2. 
Both meta-analytic Zs were statistically signifi cant, Zma = −5.40, p < .0001, 
Nfs = 355 studies, and Zmn = −6.06, p < .0001, Nfs = 453 studies. Calculation of the 
mean effect size yielded d = −.31, 95% CI: −.14 to −.48. Clearly, heightened stress 
produces the same debilitating effect on accuracy of eyewitness recall as it does on 
identifi cation accuracy. In the remaining analyses, we tested for variables that might 
have moderated this effect on recall. 
Type of Recall 
Eight estimates of effect size were associated with narrative recall (free recall); 
the remaining 28 estimates involved some form of interrogative recall (specifi c ques-
tions). The meta-analytic Z for narrative recall was not statistically reliable, Zma = 
−1.17 .Average effect size was d = −.20 (95% CI: −.68 to +.28), all the effect be ing 
generated by a single study (Clifford & Scott, 1978). For interrogative recall, Zma = 
−5.50, p < .0001, Nfs = 288. Here d was −.34, with a 95% CI extending from −.15 
to −.53. Heightened stress would appear to impact interrogative recall much more 
negatively than narrative or free recall. 
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Age 
In this sample of effect size estimates, there were 23 tests with adult witness-
es and 13 tests with children as witnesses (age range again 3–10 years). Unlike the 
sit uation with identifi cation accuracy, here age emerged as an important modera-
tor. For adults, d = −.44 (95% CI: −.19 to −.69), while for children, d was a negligi-
ble value, −.06 (95% CI: −.16 to +.04). There was a signifi cant meta-analytic Z 
for adult eyewitnesses, Zma = −6.05, p < .0001, Nfs = 286 studies. For child eyewit-
nesses, on the other hand, Zma = −1.01, a not statistically reliable value. Surprising-
ly enough, heightened stress debilitated eyewitness recall for adults, but not for chil-
dren. However, before concluding that the null hypothesis that Zma = 0.00 might 
have validity for children, one should consider that in this instance the counternull 
hypothesis (Rosenthal, 1995), Zma = −2.02, is just as likely to be true.
6 Even were 
the counternull hypothesis true, however, it would still be the case that witness age 
is an important moderator of the effect of heightened stress on eyewitness recall. 
Presence/Absence of a Staged Crime 
Though the distinction between face recognition and eyewitness identifi cation re-
search paradigms is not applicable to eyewitness recall, the distinction between pres-
ence and absence of a staged crime is indeed relevant. In our sample of studies assess-
ing eyewitness recall as a function of stress level, there were 18 independent estimates 
of effect size that included a staged crime, on fi lm or live, and 18 that did not. Meta-
analytic Zs were statistically signifi cant in both instances, Zma = −4.67, p < .0001, Nfs 
= 127 for the studies including a staged crime and Zma = −3.01, p = .0013, Nfs = 42 for 
those investigations not including a staged crime. Despite both conditions producing 
statistically reliable decrements in recall under higher levels of stress, the presence of 
a staged crime would appear to have generated a somewhat greater decrement. In sup-
port of this assertion, we may note that the effect size generated by the staged crime 
studies (d = −.45; 95% CI: −.17 to −.73) was more than twice that generated by the 
studies employing other means to induce stress (d = −.16; 95% CI: −.35 to +.03). 
DISCUSSION 
By adopting our particular inclusion criteria for our two samples of studies, we 
sought to limit our focus to experimental manipulations productive of defensive re-
sponses to stimulating conditions. In so doing, we have adduced considerable sup-
port for the hypothesis that high levels of stress negatively impact both accuracy of 
eyewitness identifi cation as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details. For 
eyewitness identifi cation, the average effect size h was −.31, with a 95% CI that 
did not include zero. Whether unweighted or weighted by sample size, the meta -
analytic Zs were associated with fail-safe Ns of 300–400 studies. Thus, the current 
6 Here the counternull value of the effect size of heightened stress is found by doubling the obtained effect 
size (Zma = −1.01) and subtracting the effect size expected under the null hypothesis, .00. 
700 DEFFENBACHER ET AL. IN LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 28 (2004)
meta-analytic conclusion regarding the negative effect of stress on eyewitness iden-
tifi cation accuracy is unlikely to be overturned any time soon by unknown fi ndings 
averaging null results. The conclusion that heightened stress debilitates eyewitness 
recall (average effect size d = −.31), too, is at least as safe, with fail-safe Ns of more 
than 350 studies associated with the overall meta-analytic Zs. 
In addition to ascertaining the direction and magnitude of the effect of height ened 
stress on accuracy of eyewitness memory, we had sought to identify variables that 
might moderate any consistent effects of stress on the fi delity of memory. We found 
two principal moderators of the negative effect of heightened stress on eye witness 
identifi cation accuracy, lineup type and research paradigm. Certainly there is prece-
dent for the importance of lineup type as a moderator of accuracy in meta- analyses of 
the eyewitness identifi cation literature (e.g., Steblay, 1997). Steblay found a moderate 
size effect for unbiased instructions to increase accuracy in TA lineups but to have no 
effect on accuracy in TP lineups. The moderator effect for lineup type found here was 
the reverse of the one found by Steblay. Here TP line ups generated an effect size (h 
= −.52), such that face identifi cation accuracy was much reduced under conditions of 
heightened stress as compared with low stress conditions, a difference of .20 in mean 
proportion correct/hit rate (.39 versus .59, respectively).7 
Quite possibly, encoding of a target person under conditions of heightened stress 
reduces the veridicality of a witness’s memory representation of him suffi  ciently to 
decrease the probability of a match between that representation and the target when 
present (TP lineups). Such an effect of stress would certainly serve to reduce the hit 
rate. The proportion correct measure for TA lineups, the correct re jection rate, might 
be similarly affected, inasmuch as reduced quality of a witness’s memory represen-
tation of the target would not provide as good a basis for rejecting a lineup that does 
not contain his face. On the other hand, members of a fair TA lineup only roughly re-
semble the target person; their faces are consistent with just a witness’s prior verbal 
description of the target, not necessarily with a high-quality visual representation of 
him. Perhaps, therefore, differences between the relatively nondegraded and stress-
degraded visual memory representations of the target are insuffi cient to affect the ba-
sis for deciding that the target face is not present in the TA lineup. Indeed there was a 
negligible effect size of heightened stress on accu racy in TA lineups; proportion cor-
rect/correct rejection rates were .34, regardless of stress level. Inasmuch as correct re-
jection rates and false alarm rates for TA lineups must sum to 1.00, there would like-
wise be no difference expected in false alarm rates for TA lineups as a function of 
differences in stress at encoding, .66 in both cases. 
We should note in passing that lineup type moderated the effect of height ened 
stress on the false alarm rate, as well. TP lineups generated an effect size (h = +.37) 
that was considerably larger than the negligible effect generated by TA lineups (h = 
.00). This TP effect corresponded to false alarm rates of .34 under high stress condi-
7
Another and perhaps more meaningful way to interpret a difference in proportion correct of this magni-
tude has been suggested by G. L. Wells (cited in Steblay, 1997). Consider, for instance, 1000 TP lineups con-
ducted over a period of time. Given the accuracy difference we have obtained, we would expect TP lineups to 
generate 200 more correct identifi cations of perpetrators witnessed under low stress condi tions than of perpetra-
tors witnessed under high stress conditions. 
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tions and .19 under low stress conditions. The aforementioned stress-induced mem-
ory degradation could account for the increased false alarm rate, as well, if indi-
rectly. Having reduced the probability of a match to the target in a TP lineup, the 
stress-induced loss of memory fi delity would then serve to increase the probabili-
ty of a “match” to some other lineup member, in direct proportion to the motiva-
tion of the eyewitness to choose someone from the lineup. In the present instance, 
much of the stress-induced lowering of the hit rate (.20) was likely “transferred” to 
an increase in the false alarm rate (.15); the remaining decrease in the hit rate (.05) 
might have resulted in an increase in the false rejection rate for a TP lineup, the lat-
ter rate rarely reported in the literature. Obviously, in a TA lineup there is no pos-
sibility of a similar transfer of witness choices from one per son, the target, to other 
possible choices. At any event, our results portend that a greater proportion of high-
stress witnesses than low-stress witnesses will choose a foil from a TP lineup and 
will thus have their subsequent credibility as a witness undermined. 
We should also note that even though the stress effect resides in TP arrays, 
plausible arguments can be made that the mix of guilty and innocent persons iden-
tifi ed by witnesses will change as a consequence, even if the proportion of posi-
tive identifi cations from TA lineups does not. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume 
that of all lineups conducted by police, half are TP and half are TA. Given the .59 
hit rate in low-stress TP lineups and the .66 false alarm rate obtained in our sample 
of TA lineups, this means that 59 guilty perpetrators would be identifi ed from every 
100 TP lineups and 66 mistaken identifi cations would be made from every 100 TA 
lineups. If we were also to assume that all lineups were perfectly fair 6-person ar-
rays, an innocent suspect embedded in a TA lineup would be mistakenly identifi ed 
11 times (66/6) per 100 arrays. Hence, the resulting pool of identifi cations would 
be 59 guilty and 11 innocent, an accuracy rate of .84 for choosers of suspects—of 
course, we should not forget that 41 guilty perpetrators would not be identifi ed. Ex-
tending our argument to the high-stress situation, our results imply that 100 TP ar-
rays would generate identifi cations of 39 guilty perpetrators and that 100 TA arrays 
would generate 66 mistaken identifi cations. An innocent suspect in the TA lineups 
would again be chosen 11 times; the resulting pool of identifi cations would be 39 
guilty and 11 innocent, an accuracy rate of .78 for choosers of suspects. 
The mix of guilty and innocent suspects would change even further, if the 
lineup arrays were to be as biased as those studied by researchers to date (Pen-
rod, 2003). The bias is such that we would expect that the innocent suspect to 
be chosen 2–3 times as often as the average foil. If the actual multiple were 
2.5, then .33 of choices from a 6-person TA lineup would be the innocent sus-
pect (2.5/2.5 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1). This means that the innocent suspect would 
be chosen by 22 witnesses from a viewing of 100 TA lineups. Consequently, the 
resulting pool of identifi cations would be 59 guilty plus 22 innocent for low-
stress witnesses (73% accuracy) and 39 guilty plus 22 innocent (64% accuracy) 
for high stress witnesses. In short, even if heightened stress does not impact TA 
lineup false alarm rates, its impact on TP lineup hit rates can change materially 
the mix of guilty and innocent suspects iden tifi ed by witnesses and the mix of 
correct and incorrect identifi cations presented to jurors. 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, nature of the research paradigm was also an impor-
tant moderator of the effect of stress level on eyewitness identifi cation accuracy. 
Mean effect size for stress level (h = −.36) was more than three times as great when 
stud ies were executed under the more ecologically valid conditions of the eyewit-
ness identifi cation paradigm than when executed within the parameters of a stan-
dard laboratory face recognition task (h = −.10). 
Two variables were likewise identifi ed as important moderators of the effect of 
heightened stress on accuracy of eyewitness recall, type of recall and witness age. 
Though it is not obvious why, it is clear that high stress levels impact interrogative re-
call much more negatively than they do narrative or free recall. Possibly the neg ative 
impact of a heightened stress level is moderated by the witness in a narrative recall 
situation having control over what to report and in what order. It is likewise not obvi-
ous why witness age should have emerged as a substantial moderator of the effect of 
heightened stress on recall, when it did not act as a moderator of stress effects on ac-
curacy of face identifi cation. However, there is support for the notion that measures 
of facial recognition and facial recall are independent, uncorrelated (Bothwell et al., 
1987; Jenkins & Davies, 1985; Pigott & Brigham, 1985; Pigott, Brigham, & Both-
well, 1990). For instance, Bothwell et al. (1987) found an interac tion between manip-
ulated stress level and neuroticism on accuracy of facial iden tifi cation but did not ob-
tain a similar interaction for a measure of facial recall, description accuracy. 
Our fi nal goals for the present review were to identify any methodological or the-
oretical shortcomings in the body of relevant literature and to consider possible direc-
tions for future theoretical development and research. As indicated earlier, there was 
quite likely a major methodological diffi culty with a number of studies showing ap-
parent facilitation of memory by increases in arousal or what was defi ned as negative 
emotionality (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Christianson, 1984; Christianson et al., 1991; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Libkuman et al., 1999; Safer et al., 1998). The negative emo-
tionality manipulation in these studies generated an orienting response (arousal mode 
of attention control) to stimulating conditions, rather than the defensive response (ac-
tivation mode of attention control) typically produced by a successful manipulation of 
stress or anxiety (Deffenbacher, 1994, 1999). Hence, investigators of stress effects on 
memory need to be concerned as to whether their experimental manipulations are elic-
iting the arousal mode of attention regulation or the activation mode. 
There is yet another matter of methodological and theoretical importance that 
investigators should consider in future research, the issue of individual differenc-
es, whether they be differences in state or trait anxiety, neuroticism, specifi c fears, 
or physiological reactivity. These differences turn out to be very important. Very dif-
ferent patterns of response to the same stimulus situation may be shown. If an in-
vestigator were not aware of this possibility, two quite different patterns of re sponse 
may cancel each other, leading to the unfortunate conclusion that an in creased stress 
level had no demonstrable impact on memory performance. Con sider an instance 
provided by a study (Bothwell et al., 1987) included in both of the present meta-
analyses. Bothwell et al. split witnesses at the median on a scale of neuroticism, 
with neurotics scoring above the median and stables (emotionally stable) scoring 
below. Neurotics are theorized to have very low thresholds for emo tional arousal 
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and to be predisposed to perceive a wide range of objectively non-dangerous situa-
tions as threatening and to respond with autonomic activation. Sta bles, on the oth-
er hand, would tend to be less anxious and physiologically reactive. The effect of 
stress level in their study varied dramatically with the level of neu roticism. As stress 
level increased from low to moderate to high, stables showed an increased level of 
identifi cation accuracy, proportion correct increasing from .50 to .62 to .75, respec-
tively. In dramatic opposition to this pattern of results was that of the neurotics; as 
stress level increased, proportions correct were .68, .68, and .32. 
Consider one more example from another study included in both our meta -
analyses, Peters’ (1988) study of university students getting inoculated at a De-
partment of Health clinic. Students were asked for physical descriptions and pho-
to lineup identifi cations of both the inoculating nurse and of a second person who 
took their pulse 2 min later. Heart rate averaged 88 b.p.m. at inoculation versus 71 
b.p.m. 2 min later. Identifi cation accuracy overall was 66% for the second person 
but only 41% for the nurse. Individual differences in physiological reactivity had 
a profound effect on identifi cation accuracy for the inoculating nurse. The 20 most 
physiologi cally reactive witnesses (39 b.p.m. average difference between inocula-
tion and two minutes later) demonstrated an identifi cation accuracy level of 31%; 
the 20 least physiologically reactive witnesses (3 b.p.m. difference), on the other 
hand, displayed an identifi cation accuracy level of 59% for the nurse. The former 
witnesses clearly defi ned the inoculation situation as one requiring vigilance, if not 
actually escape or avoidance. The latter appeared to have defi ned the situation as 
more nearly one of informative perceptual intake and did not suffer the catastrophic 
drop in memory accuracy of the more physiologically reactive witnesses. 
Hence, researchers should pay particular attention to the nature of their task. It 
may well be defi ned differently by different observers, whether it be one of simple 
perceptual intake or one of vigilance, for example. Whether the task be one that or-
dinarily produces an orienting response or a defensive response, physiological and 
self-report data must be examined carefully for the presence of the alternative re-
sponse set in individual observers. 
Thus, the modest size of the debilitating effect of heightened stress on the accu-
racy of eyewitness memory obtained in these meta-analyses may well be due to the 
averaging of its effects on two categories of witnesses, with those more anxious and 
physiologically reactive persons suffering a more serious drop in accuracy than those 
more emotionally stable persons. However, we would be remiss if we did not issue 
a further caveat concerning the modest obtained effect size. Whether the stress ma-
nipulation was a realistic and unexpected theft, a particularly violent video, or per-
haps the threat of an injection or mild electric shock, all stress manipulations in the 
literature that we have examined quite likely do not reach the stress-inducing levels of 
extra-laboratory violent crime scenes. Thus an effect size of −.31 is perhaps a se rious 
underestimate of the debilitating effects of stress engendered by violent crime. 
For instance, results of a recent study by Ihlebaek, Love, Eilertsen, and Mag-
nussen (2003) demonstrated that witnesses to a live staged robbery reported fewer 
details about the criminal event and with less accuracy than did witnesses viewing 
a video recording of the same event, even though the pattern of memory er rors was 
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similar in both conditions. We agree with Ihlebaek et al. (2003) that results of lab-
oratory studies may be an overestimate of eyewitness memory performance, espe-
cially we might add, when eyewitnesses are in a state of heightened stress. 
Indeed, Morgan et al. (2004) have provided strong support for this latter caveat. 
They studied eyewitness capabilities of more than 500 active-duty military person nel 
enrolled in a survival school program. After 12 hr of confi nement in a mock prison-
er of war camp, participants experienced 4 hr apart, both a high-stress in terrogation 
with real physical confrontation and a low-stress interrogation without physical con-
frontation; interrogations were 40 min in length. The interrogators in each instance 
were different individuals, with order of interrogation being counter balanced across 
participants. A day after release from the prisoner of war camp, and having recov-
ered from food and sleep deprivation, participants viewed a 15-person live lineup, 
a 16-person photo-spread, or a serial-presentation photo lineup of up to 16 persons. 
Regardless of testing method, memory accuracy for the high-stress in terrogator suf-
fered the same catastrophic decline from the level displayed for the low-stress in-
terrogator, the same sort of catastrophic decline noted by Bothwell et al. (1987) and 
Peters (1988). Consider just the results from the live lineup con dition: For the low 
stress condition, the hit and false alarm rates were .62 and .35, respectively, but com-
parable rates for the high stress condition were .27 and .73. 
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